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Abstract
Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under
a simplifying assumption that participation is either compulsive or unidi-
rectional optional in collective interactions. Nevertheless, how the mutual
selection rule, a more realistic participation mode, aﬀects the evolution of
cooperation in structured populations is still unclear. Here we introduce a
reputation-based mutual selection rule for constituting participant groups
into spatial threshold public goods games, where the public goods game can
be conducted only if the participant number is not less than the threshold
parameter. Interestingly, we find that moderate tolerance range results in
the best environment for cooperators’ viability. Also, we show that lower
member threshold is favorable for the evolution of cooperation, and corre-
spondingly provide some typical snapshots for defectors, “active” cooperators
(cooperators on which the public goods games are successfully conducted),
and “inactive” cooperators. Moreover, we investigate the eﬀects of memory
factor in individuals’ reputation updating on the evolution of cooperation.
Our work may provide an appropriate and alternative perspective in under-
standing the widespread cooperative behaviors in some realistic situations.
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1. Introduction
Cooperation behavior is crucial and ubiquitous, not only in human society
but also in nature. How cooperators can survive and persist in a population
of selfish individuals is an evolutionary puzzle in biology, economy and social
science [1]. To address this problem, evolutionary game theory has provided
a powerful framework [2]. While the prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG) has be-
come a paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation among individuals
through pairwise interactions [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. As a natural extension, the
N -person PDG, namely, the public goods game (PGG) for collective interac-
tions also attracts much attention [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20]. In
a typical PGG, each player in a group of N individuals is entitled to adopt ei-
ther cooperation (C) or defection (D). A cooperator donates an investment
c (c > 0) into the common pool, whereas a defector contributes nothing.
The sum is multiplied by an enhancement factor r (1 < r < N) and then
distributed equally among group members. Obviously, if all members have
cooperated, the payoﬀ of the group is maximized. But defection is always
a better choice than cooperation for a given individual in any group. The
social dilemma results as the interests of individuals do not coincide with
the interests of the group, which threatens to evolve to the “Tragedy of the
Commons” [21].
To escape hatch out of the evolutionary stalemate, several mechanisms
have been proposed, such as costly punishment [22, 23, 24, 25, 26], voluntary
participation [27, 10, 11] and social diversity [12, 28, 29]. In ref. [22], the au-
thors investigated the influence of altruistic punishment on the evolution of
cooperation in the absence of repeated interactions by empirical experiments.
They found that costly punishment is in favor of increasing the average in-
vestment of the groups. It should be noted that individuals should have some
way of discriminating defectors in this work. Diﬀerent from this assumption,
voluntary participation was introduced in refs. [27, 10] by adding the third
strategy ‘loner’ besides cooperation and defection. This simple mechanism
can eﬀectively prevent defectors from exploiting cooperators, and leads to
rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. In ref. [12],
the authors have studied the PGGs on square lattice and scale-free networks,
respectively. It is found that not only the diversity associated with the num-
ber and the size of PGGs, but also the diversity of individual contribution
to each group can promote cooperation. All these research results provide us
with novel point of view to understand the large-scale cooperation in nature
2
and human society.
In previous studies on PGGs, players either are enforced to participate
in all the PGGs that centered on his neighbors and himself [23, 12, 28, 15],
or play PGGs optionally [27, 10, 24, 11], or are selected as group members
unidirectionally by the focal individuals [30]. However, groups are not always
constituted in the ways described above. Maybe a more general situation is
that both the focal players and their neighbors have the privilege to choose
each other as their group members [31], similar to the mutual selection rule
in real life. Due to the mutual selection rule, we observe that people with
similar phenotype [32, 33, 34, 35], e.g., status and characters, are more likely
to interact with each other in human society. Herein, as an important part-
ner selection criterion, reputation can also be taken as a phenotypic feature
to discriminate individuals [36]. Indeed, in human society people with simi-
lar reputation tend to form partner relationship to make interactions. They
not only interact with others with higher reputation, but also interact with
others with lower reputation. However, individuals generally have a certain
tolerance range, and do not tend to interact with the ones whose reputation
is beyond the tolerance range. To our knowledge, such bidirectional selec-
tion mechanism is merely studied in the PDG under pairwise interactions [7].
Nevertheless, how such mutual selection regime aﬀects the evolution of coop-
eration is still unclear in PGG under collective interactions. Furthermore, to
accomplish a certain task in PGGs, perhaps the number of community mem-
bers should not be less than some fixed value. In reality, if the task is too
heavy to be completed for members in a group (Namely, there are not enough
members to bear the task.), these players will naturally give up the chance
of playing the game to avoid the certain loss. The examples of such cases are
hunting behavior of predators, building construction and public transporta-
tion. Thus it is reasonable that there exists some member threshold in PGGs
[37]. In view of the above situations, presently we consider individual toler-
ance range and reputation to construct a mutual selection mechanism into
spatial threshold PGGs. Interestingly, we find that moderate tolerance range
results in the best environment for cooperators’ viability. Besides, we show
that smaller member threshold is favorable for the evolution of cooperation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the spatial
threshold PGG and the protocol for mutual selection mechanism. Then we
present the results, whereas lastly we give some discussion and draw our
conclusion.
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2. Model
Now let us briefly introduce our model. At the start of evolution, each
player, who occupies one site of the square lattice with periodic boundary
conditions, adopts one of the two pure strategies: cooperation (C) and de-
fection (D), with equal probability. In each generation, each player i tends
to pick out his neighbor j in its Moore neighborhood if both of them are in
the tolerance range of each other’s reputation, that is, |Ri − Rj |  h, where
Ri (Rj) is the reputation score of player i (j), and h is the tolerance range
of players i and j. If the number (mi) of group members participating in
PGG that centered on player i is not less than the member threshold T ,
namely, mi  T , the PGG can be conducted successfully. Otherwise, the
PGG breaks down. For simplicity, we assume that each player has the same
tolerance range and each group has identical member threshold in this paper.
According to the rule described above, player i engages in threshold PGGs
, and the payoﬀ Pij associated with group centered on its neighbor j and itself
is given by
Pij =
{
0, ifmj < T
rmcj
mj
− Si, ifmj ≥ T
, (1)
where r indicates the enhancement factor, Si denotes the strategy of indi-
vidual i (Si = 1 for C; Si = 0 for D), and mcj is the number of cooperators
among participants in group j. Here the cost is normalized to unity. The
total payoﬀ individual i thereby acquires is the sum of the payoﬀs received
in all the groups: Pi =
∑
j Pij .
After playing the game, each player updates its reputation score. An
individual’s reputation score is assessed as a weighted average of its previ-
ous score of reputation and its immediately preceding experience with its
interaction neighbors. Thus the reputation score of player i at time step t is
Ri(t) = α
Si(t)Ni(t)
ki + 1
+ (1− α)Ri(t− 1), (2)
where 0 < α < 1 is a weighting factor, (ki + 1) denotes the maximal pos-
sible number of PGGs player i participates (ki + 1 = 9 in present model),
and Ni(t) is the actual number of PGGs player i participates at time t.
Si(t)Ni(t) represents the frequency of player i’s altruistic behaviors, while
Si(t)Ni(t)
ki+1
normalizes the number of times of player i’s altruistic behaviors.
Ri(t− 1) denotes the reputation score of player i at time t− 1.
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Afterwards, players will adjust their strategies according to the following
updating rule: player i randomly selects one of his neighbors, j, and i adopts
j’s strategy with a probability [38]:
T (Sj → Si) =
1
1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/κ]
, (3)
where κ characterizes the amplitude of noise. For κ = 0, i will adopt j’s
strategy deterministically when Pi < Pj . For κ > 0, there exists a cer-
tain possibility that strategies performing worse will be adopted. In most
cases, selfish and rational individuals prefer the strategies of more successful
neighbors. In present work, we simply fix κ = 0.1.
3. Results
Simulations are carried out for a population of size N = 30 × 30 on a
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. It should be noted that the
main results remain unchanged for diﬀerent population sizes. Initially, the
two strategies of C and D are randomly distributed among the players of the
population with equal probability. For convenience of simulation tractability,
each player’s reputation is uniformly distributed within the interval [0, 1] at
the start of evolution. When the system reaches equilibrium, the fraction of
cooperators ρc in the whole population is calculated as a key quantity for
measuring the evolution of cooperation. In all the simulations, the fraction
of cooperators ρc is obtained by averaging over the last 2× 10
3 Monte Carlo
time steps of the total 2 × 104. Synchronous update rule based on pairwise
comparison for a fixed noise level (i.e., κ = 0.1) is adopted for strategy
evolution. In what follows, we investigate how the tolerance range h aﬀects
the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, the eﬀects of member threshold T
and memory factor α are also studied.
Figure 1 shows how cooperation evolves depending on the enhancement
factor r (a) and reputation tolerance h (b), respectively. In fig. 1 (a), it
is clearly shown that the cooperation level ρc monotonously increases with
the enhancement factor r for each value of h [16]. Interestingly, compared
with other cases, the one with h = 0.4 leads to the optimal cooperation
level [see fig. 1 (a)]. It indicates that there may exist some intermediate
values of h, resulting in the most idealistic scenario for cooperators. To
further investigate the influence of h upon the cooperation level, we study
the cooperator density ρc versus tolerance range h for various r [see fig. 1
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Figure 1: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation. (a) Fraction of cooperators ρC as a
function of r for different values of h. (b) Fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of h for
different values of r. Here α is set to 0.5 and T is set to 6. Each data point results from
9× 102 independent initial realizations.
(b)]. It can be observed that there exist moderate values of h, leading to a
plateau of high cooperation level for large values of r. With decreasing r,
the length of plateau diminishes. While the value of r decreases to 3, the
plateau vanishes. However, it can still be observed that a modest value of h
induces an optimal cooperation level. Finally when r = 2.5, the cooperation
level approaches to zero irrespective of h [see fig. 1 (b)].
To understand the evolution of cooperation under such reputation-based
mutual selection mechanism more intuitively, we report the variation of frac-
tion of cooperators ρC , the average number of participators with strategy j
in PGGs centered on participators with strategy i Nij (i.e., NCC , NCD, NDC
and NDD) and the average frequency of participators with strategy i partic-
ipating in PGGs Mi (i.e., MC and MD) with respect to period in fig. 2. For
small h (e.g., h = 0.2), the interactions between cooperators via participating
in PGGs are limited due to the diﬀerent reputations of cooperators [see fig.
2 (c)]. This in turn leads to the decline of cooperators’ reputations. As a
result, cooperators can not eﬀectively filter defectors via the mutual selection
mechanism, as the reputations of cooperators and defectors are not heteroge-
neous enough compared with the tolerance range h [see fig. 2 (b)]. Whereas
for defectors, owing to low reputation, they are more likely to recruit enough
members to participate in their PGGs [see fig. 2 (c)], though most of their
group members are defectors [see fig. 2 (b)]. As a result, cooperators can not
help each other, and are wiped out by defectors eventually [see fig. 2 (a)].
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Figure 2: (Color online) Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators ρC , the average
number of participators with strategy j in PGGs centered on participators with strategy i
Nij (NCC , NCD, NDC and NDD) and the average frequency of participators with strategy
i participating in PGGs Mi (MC and MD): h = 0.2 [(a), (b) and (c)] and h = 0.4 [(d), (e)
and (f)]. Other parameter values are r = 4, α = 0.5, and T = 6, respectively. The data
shown here are obtained in one realization.
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Figure 3: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of enhancement factor r
for member threshold T = 3, 6, 8 and 9, respectively. Other parameters are h = 0.5 and
α = 0.5. Each data point results from 9× 102 independent initial realizations.
While for intermediate h (e.g., h = 0.4), on one hand, cooperators are able to
protect themselves by preventing defectors with low reputation from engag-
ing in their groups [see fig. 2 (e)]. On the other hand, compared with small
h, cooperators can engage in more PGGs to play with conspecifics [see fig.
2 (f)]. Furthermore, defectors are restricted to play PGGs with their defec-
tive neighbors [see fig. 2 (e) and 2 (f)]. The overall eﬀects induce a positive
feedback mechanism, which allows for the reciprocal interactions between co-
operators becoming larger and stronger. Then compact cooperator clusters
form and expand to the whole population [see fig. 2 (d)]. Finally for large h,
each individual has little restriction to interact with each other. In the case
that r is not large enough, defectors perform better than cooperators, and
thus dominate the population finally [see fig. 1 (b)].
In what follows, we will focus on the influence of member threshold upon
the evolution of cooperation. As shown in fig. 3, compared with the case of
large values of member threshold T , smaller T clearly promotes the evolution
of cooperation. To give an intuitive explanation to cooperators’ diﬀerent evo-
lutionary fates for various values of T , we report the evolution of the spatial
distribution of players at diﬀerent periods for T = 5 and T = 9, respectively
in fig. 4. For convenience of illustration, we distinguish a cooperator based
on whether or not the PGG centered on herself is conducted successfully.
In accordance with this criterion, cooperators can be classified as being ei-
ther “active” or “inactive” [39]. Due to the random distribution of players
and reputation at the beginning of evolution [see fig. 4 (a) and 4 (i)], on one
hand, cooperators scatter dispersedly in the network, and defectors permeate
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the whole population. On the other hand, cooperators can not discriminate
defectors through their randomly distributed reputations. As a result, coop-
erators can not escape the exploitation of defectors in the most early stages
of evolutionary process, irrespective of the values of T (see fig. 4).
Intriguingly, if the member threshold is large (e.g., T = 9), most cooper-
ators are “inactive” at the beginning. Compared with lower T , higher T is in
favor of cooperators for its restricted interaction with defectors at the start
of evolution (see fig. 4). Nonetheless, the “inactive” behaviors of cooperators
result in their decline of reputation scores as those of defectors. Hence most
cooperators are activated to play PGGs with defectors at the next time step
leading to the reduction of cooperator density. Then the majority of cooper-
ators become “inactive” again [see fig. 4 (i)-4 (k)]. Interestingly, cooperators
switch between “active” and “inactive” state in circles. This phenomenon is
similar to the “ping-pong eﬀect” as reported in refs. [40]. However, cooper-
ators can not escape the fate of extinction eventually [see fig. 4 (p)]. While
for small T (e.g., T = 5), the majority of cooperators are “active” in the
beginning [see fig. 4 (a)]. Most “active” cooperators are vulnerable in the
presence of defectors at the start of evolution [see fig. 4 (a)-4 (d)]. But along
with the evolutionary process moving forward, the reputations of the individ-
uals, who frequently exploit the public goods, gradually become inferior to
that of the few contributors left. Thus these individuals with low reputations
will be banished by cooperators through the mechanism of mutual selection.
Namely, the aggregation of cooperators works. Herein we argue that once
the positive assortments of cooperators works, smaller member threshold T
is better for cooperators’ viability [see fig. 4 (e)-4 (h)]. On one hand, smaller
member threshold T induces dynamic group size, which determines a richer
spectrum of individual payoﬀs. On the other hand, compared with the case
of large T , the social dilemma of groups with smaller sizes existing in the
case of smaller T is more relaxed. As a result, cooperators have higher prob-
ability to survive with small T than that they have with large T (see fig. 3).
Intriguingly, our findings agree with the results reported in ref. [12]. The
authors reported that in the case each player invests a fixed cost per game,
both the diversity in the size of each player’s PGG and the number of PGGs
in which each player participates induced by the heterogeneity of the under-
lying networks facilitate the evolution of cooperation. Our findings confirm
their research results. While in our work, the diversity for the evolution
of cooperation is induced by the mutual selection mechanism and member
threshold, rather than the network structure. For further study, we think it
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is interesting to study the properties of patterns about these “active” and
“inactive” cooperators.
Finally, we would like to discuss the eﬀect of memory (i.e., weighting
factor α) upon the evolutionary fate of cooperators. Figure 5 shows the co-
operation level as a function of tolerance range h for diﬀerent values of α.
Clearly, in each case, there still exists intermediate values of h, which result
in the best environment for viability of cooperators. Moreover, for small h,
smaller weighting factor α induces better chance for the survival of coop-
erators, while larger and moderate α is more favorable for the evolution of
cooperation in the case of large and intermediate values of h, respectively.
Actually, it is not diﬃcult to explain those phenomena. While the values of
α are small, individuals’ reputation mainly depends on the historical perfor-
mance, which slows down the separation process of the reputation scores of
cooperators and defectors, but indicates the exact information regarding the
cooperativity of their neighbors in all past games. In this situation, for small
h, on one hand, cooperators can protect themselves by restricting interaction
with defectors. On the other hand, due to the exact information induced by
small α, cooperators can distinguish each other more accurately. Hence while
h is small, smaller α is better for cooperators to help each other (see fig. 5).
However, when α is large, player’s reputation mainly relies on the current
performance, which introduces a rapid feedback mechanism between the rep-
utation score and the present performance. But due to the diﬀerent number
of groups in which each cooperator participates, the reputation score of co-
operators dissimilates. As a result, the interaction between cooperators will
be inhibited for small h. While for large h, cooperators interact with each
other with little restriction (see fig. 5). Thus in the case of large h, larger
α is more beneficial for cooperators to evolve. While h is intermediate, as
one can expect, moderate values of α induces the best environment for the
evolution of cooperation (see fig. 5).
4. Discussion and conclusion
Recently, Chen and Wang studied the PDG by considering the mutual
selection mechanism in the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks [7]. They
found that moderate tolerance range can result in the best promotion of
cooperation. It should be noted that our model is diﬀerent from theirs. In
our model, the mutual selection mechanism is studied on a square lattice
in the context of collective interaction. Hence, we not only can explore
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Figure 4: (Color online) Time evolution of distributions of players on a square lattice for
T = 5 [(a) t = 0, (b) t = 2, (c) t = 4, (d) t = 8, (e) t = 50, (f) t = 100, (g) t = 150, and
(h) t = 200] and T = 9 [(i) t = 0, (j) t = 1, (k) t = 2, (l) t = 3, (m) t = 4, (n) t = 5, (o)
t = 6, and (p) t = 7] at r = 4. Blue and green represent inactive and active cooperators,
respectively, while red denotes defectors. These snapshots show a 100×100 square lattice.
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Figure 5: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators ρC as a function of h for different values
of α. Here r is set to 3.5 and T is set to 6. The results are obtained in 9×102 independent
initial realizations.
the eﬀect of reputation tolerance more directly in a homogeneous networked
environment, but also can study how the mutual selection mechanism works
in the context of group interaction. Moreover, in this work we consider a
member threshold parameter, that is, only if the number of participants
approaches the member threshold the public good game is conducted. It is
worth pointing out that this threshold parameter is diﬀerent from the one in
refs. [14, 16, 41, 39], where the public good is produced only if the number
of cooperators is not less than the threshold. Correspondingly, the payoﬀ
function in our model is diﬀerent from the step gain all-or-nothing function
in other related threshold PGG models. Under this mutual selection rule in
threshold PGGs, the participant group for collective interaction may shrink
and diversity of interaction groups emerges even in a homogeneous graph,
which are demonstrated to support the evolution of cooperation [12]. In
a sense, our study further confirms and compensates the positive eﬀects of
moderate tolerance on the evolution of cooperation in a more realistic and
complicated environment.
In summary, we have studied the spatial threshold PGGs by considering
mutual selection mechanism based on individual reputation and tolerance.
We have shown that such mutual selection results in the optimal cooperation
level at moderate values of tolerance range. In addition, we have investigated
the eﬀect of member threshold in PGGs. Although cooperative behavior ini-
tially dose seem to fare better under the regime of large member threshold, in
the long run the evolution of cooperation is impeded due to the homogeneity
of defectors’ and cooperators’ reputation. While smaller member threshold
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induces nasty environment for cooperators at the very infancy of the games,
but it is, after all, good for cooperator’s viability in a long term. Interestingly,
via the classification of cooperators as being either “active” or “inactive”, an
intriguing “ping-pong eﬀect” emerges in the case of high member threshold.
Finally, we studied the influence of memory on the evolution of cooperation.
We found that there exists an optimal tolerance range leading to the highest
cooperation density for each value of weighting factor. Furthermore, it is
found that small values of weighting factor are more favorable for coopera-
tors’ viability when tolerance rang is small; intermediate values of weighting
factor are better for the evolution of cooperation when tolerance range is
moderate; and large values of weighting factor are beneficial for the survival
of cooperators when tolerance range is large.
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